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The Chief Justice says religion is still relevant 
 
“The Relevance of Religion” is the title of a recent address delivered by The Honourable Chief 
Justice Murray Gleeson of the High Court of Australia.1 In making the point “about the continuing 
public importance of religion”, the Chief Justice referenced Lord Devlin’s contention that “no 
society has yet solved the problem of how to teach morality without religion”.2 
 
Though Lord Devlin’s contention dates to 1965, the Chief Justice demonstrates that the Devlin 
view is not a mere historical curiosity by adding his own commentary: 
 
“There can be morality without religion; just as there can be religion without true morality. 
But having an individual and personal conviction is not the only thing that is important. It 
is the general acceptance of values that sustains the law, and social behaviour; not 
private conscience. Whether the idea is expressed in terms of teaching, or 
communication, there has to be a method of getting from the level of individual belief to 
the level of community values. Religion is one method of bridging that gap. What are the 
alternatives? Apart from religion, what is it that forms and sustains the moral basis upon 
which much of our law depends? How are community values developed and maintained 
in a pluralist society? I do not suggest that it cannot be done; but it is not easy. 
 
This aspect of the contribution of religion to society, and to the law, is often overlooked or 
underestimated.”3 
 
The Chief Justice introduced these remarks with a brief analogy of the different paradigm that 
exists in society now as compared with the times of Sir Thomas More and Cromwell.  “[I]n the 
16th century it would have been generally accepted that Parliament had no authority to make a 
law contrary to true religion. Now ... the opposite view prevails.”4 This shift might be explained, at 
least in part, by some present perceived need to completely sever any relationship between 
Church and State which has seen any religious involvement in the public forum pilloried as 
heresy by those who conform to a prevailing secular areligious thought paradigm. 
 
Much more might be said and written about the fundamentality5 of both freedom of religion and 
conscience, and freedom of speech – and their interrelationship6 – but the currency of Chief 
Justice Gleeson’s assertion of the continuing relevance of religion does away with the immediate 
need to develop that justification for the premise behind this paper. That premise is that it is not 
only the purely humanitarian works of institutionalised religion that make its works valuable to 
society – it is the very essence of any religion’s mission, that citizenship and society be improved 
through selflessness.7 
                                                          
1 Occasional Address on the occasion of the Christmas Service for Lawyers, St James Church, Sydney, 29 
November 2000 - published in (2001) 75 ALJ 93. 
2 P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford University Press  (Oxford  1965), p 25. 
3 Gleeson, “The Relevance of Religion” (2001) 75 ALJ 93 at 95. 
4 Ibid, at 93. 
5 Demoting freedom of religion and conscience and belief to a place of lesser importance in the pecking order 
when new constitutions are drafted (contrast, for example, the US Bill of Rights and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights, where this freedom is placed first and sixth respectively) obfuscates the foundational importance of 
freedom of religion and conscience - to the meaning and even the very existence of all the others. 
6 For example, what does it mean to be able to speak and publish one’s thoughts freely, if one is not permitted to 
think as one pleases because of prevailing notions of political correctness?  George Orwell elaborated his 
concerns about this modern loss of understanding of the fundamentality of freedom of religion and conscience 
through his “thought police” in his celebrated novel, 1984. 
7 “[R]eligions that command the devotion of their members actually promote freedom and reduce the likelihood 
of democratic tyranny by splitting the allegiance of citizens and pressing on their members’ points of view that 
are often radically different from the preferences of the state.” Professor L Carter, The Culture of Disbelief, New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland, Doubleday, 1993, p 8; see also pp 35-38. 




This generalised assertion may well distract some readers into musing about the spaceman cult 
or the Jonestown suicides – so it may be conceded that religious practice viewed generally 
certainly has its share of excesses.8  But, to balance that perspective, it is well to not overlook 
“that the most horrible moral atrocities of the twentieth century in terms of death and human 




Although the term “religion” may properly be applied to an identifiable set of beliefs and practices 
having a particular character, that term is not susceptible to the type of definition which will 
enable the question of whether a particular system of beliefs and practices is a religion to be 
determined by use of the syllogism of formal logic.10 The criterion for religion must be found in 
the indicia exhibited by acknowledged religions11 or derived by empirical observation of accepted 
religions – acknowledging that the indicia is liable to vary with changing social conditions and the 
relative importance of any particular one of them will vary from case to case.12 
 
The leading Australian authority on what constitutes a “religion” is the High Court decision in 
Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic).13  The decision confirms that 
there is no single characteristic which can be laid down as constituting a formularized legal 
criterion, whether of inclusion or exclusion, of whether a particular system of ideas and practices 
constitutes a religion within a particular State of the Commonwealth of Australia.14 The court was 
unanimous in the view that any test should not limit “religion” to theistic religions – to do so would 
exclude, for example, Theravada Buddhism, an acknowledged religion.15 
 
In their joint judgment in Church of the New Faith, Mason ACJ and Brennan J held that, for the 
purposes of the law, 
                                                          
8 Professor W C Durham Jr: “Forgetting the paradox of religious freedom has been a cause of incalculable 
suffering during human history. Too often, groups who have pleaded for tolerance while they were a persecuted 
minority, have turned into persecutors as soon as they acquired political power .... What those who forget this 
paradox do not understand is that the mere possession of truth does not carry with it a right to impose that truth 
on others. God possesses all truth, yet He has left us our freedom.” (“The Doctrine of Religious Freedom”, 
Devotional Address, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, USA, 3 April 2001, p 10, unpublished at the time 
of this writing.) 
9 DH Oaks, “Religious Values and Public Policy”, Ensign, October 1992, 60 at 61. 
10 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 171. 
11 Ibid, at 132. 
12 Ibid, at 173. 
13 (1983) 154 CLR 120 - coram: Mason ACJ, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ. The issue was whether 
the appellant, also known as the Church of Scientology, was a “religious institution” within the meaning of s.10 
of the Pay-roll Tax Act 1971 (Vic) - if so, wages paid or payable by the appellant were exempt from pay-roll 
tax. In their joint judgment, Mason ACJ and Brennan J noted that “the question whether Scientology is a 
religion cannot be answered, for there seem to be important, perhaps critically important, tenets of Scientology 
which the parties left without full examination. The question which can be answered is whether the beliefs, 
practices and observances which were established by the affidavits and the oral evidence as the set of beliefs, 
practices an observances accepted by Scientologists are properly to be described as a religion.”(emphasis 
added): 154 CLR at 130; see too at 176 per Wilson and Deane JJ. The latter question was on the evidence 
answered affirmatively; it followed (on the way the case was argued) that the taxpayer corporation was a 
religious institution: 154 CLR at 130 and 148. 
R v Registrar General; ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697 CA held that a Chapel of the Church of Scientology 
was not a place of meeting for religious worship. The court in Church of the New Faith 154 CLR at 140 saw ex 
parte Segerdal as applying a test that limited “religion” to theistic religions - a test which the High Court 
rejected. 
14 Church of the New Faith (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 173. 
15 Ibid, at 140, 154-155, 172-173. 
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“the criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; 
and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, 
though canons of conduct which offend against the ordinary laws are outside the area of 
any immunity, privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion.”16 
 
For Murphy J, it was enough that the subject body claims its beliefs and practices to be religious 
and to believe in a supernatural Being or Beings – visible or invisible.17 
 
Of the observable indicia of acknowledged religions generally, Wilson and Deane JJ, nominate 
five indicia as the more important of the indicia or guidelines by reference to which the question 
of religion falls to be answered, but note that no one of these is  necessarily determinative of the 
question whether a particular collection of ideas and/or practices should be objectively 
characterized as “a religion”.18 In summary form, the five indicia are: belief in the supernatural 
(described by their Honours as “one of the more important”); beliefs going to man’s relation to 
things supernatural; accepted standards or codes of conduct; an identifiable group of adherents; 
the adherents seeing their ideas and/or practices as constituting a religion (an indicium their 
Honours acknowledged as “perhaps more controversial”).19 
 
Thus it might be said that in general, under the law of Australia,20 a religion is a system of ideas 
and practices usually involving a belief in the supernatural.21 
 
Religion connects “private conscience” to the rule of law 
 
The Chief Justice’s overt point was that organised religion provides a method to “bridge the gap” 
between individual belief and “the general acceptance of values that sustain the law and social 
behaviour”. But the insight exposed is deeper than merely the identification of the need for 
institutions and policies in our society that can build bridges that sustain the law and social 
behaviour. An underlying point is that “private conscience” alone does not carry with it the power 
to protect society from collective human weakness; that “private conscience” must be harnessed 
or collected in some way if it is to protect, influence and wisely shape societal development. 
 
Institutional religion in society, and institutional religion alone, seems to reliably and consistently 
provide that collector function.  Institutional religion has had an undefined role in mustering and 
shaping collective conscience and values in moral ways – and when institutional religion is 
pluralised, so much the better for we avoid the excesses that Alexis de Tocqueville identified so 
long ago when he coined his colourful phrase, “the tyranny of the majority”.22 
 
                                                          
16 Ibid, at 136. 
17 Ibid, at 151. 
18 Ibid, at 173. 
19 See ibid, at 174 for the full exposition of the five indicia. 
20 The High Court’s view of “religion” in Church of the New Faith was applied in New Zealand in Centrepoint 
Community Growth Trust v CIR [1985] 1 NZLR 673. 
21 The Commissioner of Taxation in a public ruling has indicated that he considers that in determining whether 
a particular set of beliefs and practices constitute a religion the two most important factors are those stated by 
Mason ACJ and Brennan J in Church of the New Faith (namely, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or 
Principle; and, acceptance of canons of conduct which give effect to that belief, but which do not offend against 
the ordinary laws): see Taxation Ruling TR 92/17. 
22 Tocqueville’s concern in writing in the 1830s about democracy in America, essentially for Frenchmen 
coming to terms with and learning lessons from their experiences of democracy and empire, was that all he saw 
as salutary in the then new American system of checks and balances could be offset and even destroyed by what 
he called “the tyranny of the majority”.  He sought to find in society an “obstacle” which can “retard [the 
majority in] its course and give it time to moderate its own vehemence”.  (A de Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America, London, Everyman’s Library, 1994, pp 257-261.) 
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It does seem that present-day Australia has no need to fear fanatical religious tyranny, for the 
simple reason that no one religion holds a majority to wield or exercise in a tyrannical way.23 
 
Certainly the Chief Justice was quoting Lord Devlin when stating “no society has yet solved the 
problem of how to teach morality without religion”24, but it is the Chief Justice who has identified 
organised religion’s role in harnessing, mustering or collecting individual private consciences as 
the singular key to its success in providing society with moral values. 
 
Even after some reflection it is not obvious which, if any, public or private institutions in our 
society might properly achieve or satisfy the “collecting” function.  
 
Plainly there are public or private institutions which have an influence in collecting and shaping 
public consciousness. The media, sports organisations, and even political parties do have the 
mass membership and influence to shape and even direct public opinion.25 But it seems trite that 
these institutions cannot be relied on for a clear and certain moral sound, since they do not even 
aspire to provide one26 – and they have their own less altruistic agendas.27 
 
If religion alone serves society in this singularly valuable way, should it not be nourished and 
encouraged on its way?  History has certainly believed that it should, and in adopting the US 
modular language in our constitutional provision about freedom of religion, our framers were so 
persuaded as well.  
 
History approved “the advancement of religion” as a charitable object 
 
Charitable uses or trusts form a distinct head of equity28; ultimately, it falls to the court to 
determine whether particular purposes are charitable.29 
 
Not every religious purpose is, in the legal sense, a “charitable” object or purpose.30 However, it 
is well settled that a gift for religious purposes, in the sense of purposes conducive to the 
                                                          
23 See Appendix I (1996 Australian Census information on demographics of religions in Australia). 
24 Professor Carter quotes the George Lawrence translation of Tocqueville’s nineteenth century work, 
Democracy in America (Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, 1969) in aid of the view that the support given 
by religion to virtuous standards of behavior is indispensable for the preservation of liberty (Carter, above n 7, p 
38) - the same idea that caught the imagination of both Chief Justice Gleeson and Lord Devlin. 
25 In terms of pure reach, these organisations, particularly media, must have more sustained influence on public 
opinion (by virtue of the daily opportunity to do so) than all the religions in Australia combined. The media, 
sports organisations and political parties seldom seek to provide public guidance on moral issues, and when they 
do, any clear sound they might send is usually lost in the din of debate. So, for example, if the sports hooligan is 
circumscribed at all, it is by the dictates of his/her own conscience, perhaps educated by institutional religion 
rather than the sporting body condemning such conduct, as shown by recent European and Australian 
experience. 
26 While there may be some altruism in sporting creeds and political parties, on any pragmatic view, that is not 
their primary focus. But institutional religion has the good of mankind as its essential premise. 
27 It is acknowledged, however, that there is altruism in the role of the media in protecting and enhancing 
freedom of expression; in the role of sports organisations in seeking to implant notions of fair play; and in the 
utilitarian aspirations of political parties - at their best. 
28 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 580 per Lord Macnaghten. 
29 National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31 at 63 per Lord Simonds. Charitable trusts and 
institutions “enjoy rare and increasing privileges” (Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 
297 at 307.5 per Lord Simonds) a fact which can encourage a trust or institution which may be established or 
conducted such that it qualifies as charitable, to seek to do so. It is trite that fiscal privileges are usually open to 
legal charities (Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601at 614B, 614E); legal charities also enjoy immunity from the 
rules against perpetuity and uncertainty (Dingle v Turner [1972] AC at 624D-F). 
30 Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426. See too Radmanovich v Nedeljkovic [2001] NSWSC 492 at para 180, 
Bradshaw The Law of Charitable Trusts in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 1983) pp 25-26, and Dal Pont 
Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000) p 142. 
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“advancement of religion”,31 is a good or valid charitable object or purpose at law.32 In this 
context, “advancement of religion” is the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the 
maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and 
manifest it.33 Perhaps by their very nature and character such teaching and doctrines are 
identifiable as the genesis or fundamental motivation34 of all conduct expressive of an object or 
purpose that is charitable, even in the strict legal sense. 
 
There is no doubt today, nor has there been since at least 1805, that “advancement of religion” 
is a charitable object; that an organisation for the advancement of religion is a charity.35 
 
The word “charity”, or “charitable”, is a word which is “wide, elastic”36; a word which, in its widest 
sense denotes “all good affections men ought to bear towards each other”; in its most restricted 
and common sense, “relief of the poor”.37 But the word “has a much wider meaning in law than it 
has in popular speech”38 such that the popular meaning of the words “charity” and “charitable” 
do not coincide with their legal meaning – “it is difficult to fix the point of divergence, and no one 
as yet has succeeded in defining the popular meaning of the word “charity”.”39 In the legal sense, 
“charity” or “charitable” is a word of art of precise and technical meaning.40 In discussing this 
matter, Lord Macnaghten, in Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel,41 said: 
 
“of all words in the English language bearing a popular, as well as a legal signification, I 
am not sure that there is one which more unmistakably has a technical meaning in the 
strictest sense of the term, that is, a meaning clear and distinct peculiar to the law as 
understood and administered in this country, and not depending upon or coterminous 
with the popular or vulgar use of the word.” 
 
The earliest legislative attempt to expound the concept of “charity” is found in the preamble to 
the Charitable Uses Act of 1601 (43 Eliz I, c.4), commonly referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth 
I.42 That enactment was a reforming statute, directed not so much to the definition of charity as 
to the correction of abuses which had grown up in the administration of trusts of a charitable 
nature.43 
 
The preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth I (the “Preamble”) contained a catalogue of purposes 
which were, as long ago as 1601, considered to be charitable – these were the “charitable and 
godlie uses” over which commissioners appointed under the 1601 Act were to have jurisdiction. 
                                                          
31 Re Vaughan (1886) 33 Ch D 187 at 191. 
32 Dunn v Byrne [1912] AC 407 at 411 per Lord Macnaghten. 
33 Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel Ltd v IRC [1931] 2 KB 465 CA Lord Hanworth MR at p.477. See too United 
Grand Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council [1957] 3 All ER 281 
at 285F-G. 
34 By virtue of being an imperative (whether conscious or subconscious) system of values. 
35 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805)10 Ves 522; 32 ER 947; Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v 
Pemsel [1891] AC 531; Flynn v Mamarika (1996) 130 FLR 218; Radmanovich v Nedeljkovic [2001] NSWSC 
492. 
36 Re Cranston [1898] 1 IR 431 at 442, per Lord Ashbourne C. 
37 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399 at 405; 32 ER 656 at 658. 
38 Re Wedgewood [1915] 1 Ch 113 at 117. 
39 ITC v Pemsel [1891] AC at 583 per Lord Macnaghten. 
40 National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31 at 41 per Lord Wright. 
41 [1891] AC 531 at 581-582. 
42 This 1601 statute was a re-enactment, with amendments, of the Charitable Uses Act of 1597 (39 Eliz I, c.6): 
Gareth Jones, History of the Law of Charity 1532 – 1827, (Cambridge, 1969), p 23ff. The 1597 and 1601 
statutes are reproduced in Gareth Jones at, respectively, Appendix C (pp 221-223) and Appendix D (pp 224-
228). 
43 N above 42. 
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Lord Macnaghten, in ITC v Pemsel,44 said of the Preamble that it contained “a list of charities so 
varied and comprehensive, that it became the practice of the Court to refer to it as a sort of index 
or chart.” 
 
The charitable uses listed in the Preamble45 were those to which various items of property “have 
bene heretofore given limitted appointed and assigned”, namely, 
 
“some for Releife of aged, impotent, and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke 
and maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schools of Learninge, Free Schooles and 
Schollers in Universities, some for Repaire of Bridges Ports Havens Causewaies 
Churches Seabankes and Highwaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of Orphans, 
some for or towards Releife Stocke or Maintenance of Howses of Correccion, some for 
Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of younge tradesmen 
Handicraftesmen and persons decayed and others for releife or redemption of Prisoners 
or Captives and for aide or ease of any poor Inhabitantes concerninge paymente of 
Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other Taxes;” 
 
It seems likely that those responsible for drafting the Preamble drew on the words of the 
fourteenth century poem, The Vision of Piers Plowman. In the poem, Truth counsels anxious and 
rich merchants to obtain remission of sins and a happy death by using their fortunes for 
charitable purposes in these (modernised) terms:46 
 
And therewith repair hospitals 
help sick people 
mend bad roads 
build up bridges that had broken down 
help maidens to marry or to make them nuns 
find food for prisoners and poor people 
put scholars to school or to some other craft, 
help religious orders and 
ameliorate rents or taxes.47 
 
The objects described in the Preamble were to be regarded as instances and not as the only 
objects of charity48 – there were uses, admittedly charitable, which were neither within the 
statute’s letter nor its equity.49 Even so, the Preamble had a limiting rather than enlarging effect 
on the meaning of “charity” because judges seemed to feel constrained to not hold purposes 
charitable unless they could fairly be said to be within the “spirit and intendment” of the 
Preamble.50 
 
                                                          
44 [1891] AC 531 at 581. 
45 The relevant part of the Preamble is reproduced in Gareth Jones, p 224. 
46 Hubert Picarda, The law and Practice Relating to Charities, 3rd ed (Butterworths, London, 1999), p 9; 
Keeton and Sheridan, Modern Law of Charities, 4th ed. (1992) p 58; and see Jordan, Philanthropy in England 
1418 –1660 (1959) 112. 
47 The poem was written in 1377, and an earlier version (in substance identical) in 1362: see Joseph Willard, 
“Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Près” (1894–95) 8 Harvard Law Review 69 at p 70. 
48 London University v Yarrow (1857) 1 De Gex & Jones 72 at 79; 44 ER 649 at 652 per Cranworth LC; Re 
Foveaux, Cross v London Anti-vivisection Society [1895] 2 Ch 501 at 504. 
49 Gareth Jones, pp 33 and 121. 
50 See e.g., Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 9 Ves 399 at 405 per Sir William Grant MR; ITC v Pemsel 
[1891] AC at 581; Williams’ Trustees v IRC [1947] AC 447 at 455 per Lord Simonds. See too Incorporated 
Council of Law Reporting of (Queensland) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 659 at 666-
667 per Barwick CJ; Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd (1998) 195 CLR 566 at 582, para 34-35. 
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According to Lord Macnaghten in ITC v Pemsel,51 “charity” in its legal sense “comprises four 
principal divisions” – which his Lordship recited as: 
 
“trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the 
advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not 




“The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law because 
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every charity that 
deserves the name must do, either directly or indirectly.” 
 
Lord Macnaghten’s “four principal divisions” adopt and adapt (without attribution) the 
submissions of Sir Samuel Romilly52 made as counsel for the plaintiff in Morice v Bishop of 
Durham. In that case Romilly submitted: 
 
“There are four objects, within one of which all charity, to be administered in this Court, 
must fall: first, relief of the indigent; and various ways: money: provisions: education: 
medical assistance; etc: secondly, the advancement of learning: thirdly, the 
advancement of religion; and, fourthly, which is the most difficult, the advantage of 
objects of general public utility.”53 
 
The Statute of Elizabeth I was repealed by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 (51 & 52 
Vict c.42). However s.13(2) of the 1888 Act provided that certain references to charities in 
various enactments and documents should be construed as references to charities within the 
meaning, purview, and interpretation of the Preamble.54 The 1888 Act was repealed by the 
Charities Act 1960 (UK), which in turn was repealed by the Charities Act 1993 (UK). But even 
before its repeal the Preamble never had any statutory operation, and so its final removal from 
the statute books does not affect the authority of the cases decided on it nor the principles on 
which future cases are to be decided.55 
 
It seems apparent that gifts for purposes which, even today, are regarded as “charitable” at law, 
have their beginning in religious obligation. In 1215 Gregory IX in a papal decretal urged the 
faithful to seek their salvation by bequeathing part of their wealth to the support of pious causes: 
“the day of harvest” should be anticipated “with works of great mercy, and for the sake of things 
eternal, to sow on earth what we should gather in Heaven, the Lord returning it with increased 
fruit”.56 The impious testator, who refused to observe this exhortation, might be denied the 
Eucharist and interred in unconsecrated ground. A similar fate might befall the person who died 
intestate, for he too had failed to make provision for works of great mercy before death, but to 
ensure his salvation the Church obtained the right to administer his estate and to distribute a 
portion of it ad pias causas.57 
                                                          
51 [1891] AC at 583. 
52 See Re Macduff [1896] 2 Ch 451 CA at 466. 
53 (1805) 10 Ves at 532; 32 ER at 951. 
54 See too s 38, Charities Act 1960 (UK). 
55 Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v A-G [1971] Ch 624 at 644 per Foster J; affd 
[1972] Ch 73 CA. The Statute of Elizabeth I was repealed in New South Wales by the Imperial Acts Application 
Act 1969 No.30 (s 8) and in Queensland, by the Trusts Act 1973. Section 9(2)(a) of the 1969 Act, and s 103(1) 
of the 1973 Act, provide that the “repeal by this Act” of the Charitable Uses Act 1601 does and shall “not affect 
the established rules of law relating to charity”. 
56 Letter of Authorisation for Collectors for Charitable Institutions, approved by the 4th Lateran Council (1215) 
and included in the decretals of Gregory IX: cited in Gareth Jones, 
p 3. 
57 Gareth Jones, p 3. 




Pious causes were causes which honoured God and his Church. These would comprise gifts for 
religious services, for vestments, orbits, candles and such like, for repair of churches, and for the 
upkeep of religious houses. The canonical conception of piety extended to gifts for the relief of 
distress and suffering on earth – which embraced gifts for relief of the poor, the maimed and 
suffering, and the upkeep and repair of hospitals, bridges, roads and dykes.58 
 
In the Middle Ages, under the influence of the Church, great importance was attributed to 
charitable giving as both a Christian duty and a means of salvation. The Church obtained the 
right to administer intestate estates and to distribute a portion of it ad pias causas. Apart from 
gifts for the advancement of religion, the Church became recipient of most other charitable gifts 
– it being the administrator of pious causes – such welfare and educational services as existed 
at that time had been largely instituted and developed by the Church. Thus in the Middle Ages 
the Church was the provider of welfare services (including education) for the general population, 
funded by gifts from the public who were encouraged by religious exhortation to make such 
donations or gifts. 
 
The fundamental principles governing charity law in England were evolved by the Ecclesiastical 
courts, predecessors of the Court of Chancery. By the reign of Henry III, the ecclesiastical courts 
had secured an exclusive jurisdiction over the testament of personalty. With the Reformation 
came the overthrow of papal supremacy and the decline of the authority of organised religion. In 
consequence the objects of charity became more secular.59 
 
Both Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Macnaghten include “advancement of religion” as a charitable 
purpose. Plainly, however, there is no item in the Preamble which either stipulates or can be 
construed as, “advancement of religion” – the item that comes closest is “the repair ... of 
churches”. The Preamble did not of course, purport to be an exhaustive or exclusive list of the 
objects of charity. In any event, long before 1601 pious uses including the advancement of 
religion had been considered an object of charity.60 
 
The enactment of statutes which proscribed certain religious practices of other than the 
Established Church, gave rise to court decisions holding that gifts relating to certain religious 
rites of other than the Established Church were invalid as being inter alia superstitious uses. In 
broad terms a superstitious use was one which has for its object the propagation or the rites of a 
religion not tolerated by the law.61 
 
Until the enactment of the Toleration Act of 1688 (1 Will & M, c.18)62 various penal laws ensured 
that only gifts to the Established Church would be upheld. So it was that the gift to non-
conformist ministers held invalid in AG v Baxter63 in 1684 was upheld on appeal 4 years later.64 
Giving an historical perspective to these penal laws, Lord Parker in Bowman v Secular Society65, 
noted that as long as those statutes remained in force, no trust for the purposes of any other 
religion than the Christian religion, or any form of Christianity other than the Anglican was 
enforceable, “because it was clearly against public policy to promote a religion, or form of 
religion, the exercise of which was penalized by statute.” 
                                                          
58 Ibid, pp 3-4. 
59 Ibid, pp 4, 10. 
60 Ibid, pp 3-4; see too R v Commissioners of Income Tax (1888) 22 QBD 296 at 310. 
61 Bourne v Keane [1919] AC 815 at 844-845. For a summary of the history of superstitious uses see Bourne v 
Keane [1919] AC at 838ff; see too T.Bourchier-Chilcott, Superstitious Uses (1920) 36 LQR 152. 
62 See Evans’ Case (1767) 3 Merivale 376n where Lord Mansfield said that the 1688 Act rendered 
nonconformity not only innocent “but lawful”. 
63 (1684) 1 Vern 248. 
64 Sub nom AG v Hughes (1689) 2 Vern 105 - and see Thomas v Howell (1874) LR 18 Eq 198 at 208-209. 
65 [1917] AC 406 at 448. 




The Statute of Chantries of 1547 (1 Edw 6, c.14) made retrospective provisions which dealt with 
existing endowments for the maintenance of masses for the repose of souls of deceased 
persons. These endowments were appropriated by the Crown and diverted to the founding of 
schools apparently on the basis that such gifts were prohibited by the Statute. In West v 
Shuttleworth66 the court decided that gifts for the saying of masses for the dead, although not 
within the terms of the Chantries Act, were within the superstitious uses intended to be 
suppressed by that enactment. 
 
Sir Francis Moore was a member of the Parliaments which enacted the Statute of Elizabeth I 
and its 1597 predecessor.67 In August 1607, Sir Francis Moore, Sergeant at Law, delivered his 
Reading in Middle Temple Hall, “Upon the Statute of 43 Eliz. concerning Charitable Uses”.68 
According to the Reading, the omission of express reference to religious purposes was 
deliberate: 
 
“Lest the gifts intended to be employed upon purposes grounded upon charity, might, in 
change of times (contrary to the minds of the givers) be confiscate into the King’s 
Treasury. For religion being variable, according to the pleasure of succeeding princes, 
that which at one time is held for Orthodox, may at another be accounted Superstitious, 
and then such lands are confiscate, as appears by the Statute of Chanteryes, 1 Edw 6, 
c.14”.69 
 
Referring, in Bourne v Keane, to Moore’s explanation, Birkenhead LC observed, 
“It seems, therefore, according to this view, that Parliament, in order to prevent the risk 
that the pious intentions of donors might be defeated by possible confiscation, 
determined with grave irony that if the donors expressed such intention confiscation 
should become inevitable.”70 
 
The Lord Chancellor went on to express the view that, 
 
“the plain truth of the matter is that when the Reformation became an accomplished fact 
the general notion was that only one form of religion could be safely allowed, and, 
therefore, there was an instinctive feeling that such gifts should not be permitted. 
Lawyers accordingly sought for a juridicial basis, and the reported statement of Sir 
Francis Moore is one of the attempts to find such a basis.”71 
 
By majority (which included Birkenhead LC), the House of Lords in Bourne v Keane72 held that 
gifts for the saying of masses were valid and that West v Shuttleworth and cases following it 
were wrong, they having proceeded on a wrong assumption, namely, that there was a prohibition 
in the statute of Chantries.73 (Prior to the decision in Bourne v Keane, gifts for the saying of 
masses were held to be valid in a number of other jurisdictions74 including New Zealand75 and 
Australia.76) 
                                                          
66 (1835) 2 My & K 684; 39 ER 1106. 
67 Gareth Jones, p 31. It seems likely that Sir Francis Moore was not one of the draftsmen of that legislation: 
see Gareth Jones, p 24 fn2, pp 231-234. 
68 Gareth Jones, pp 231-234. 
69 Gareth Jones, p 32 fn 1; Bourne v Keane [1919] AC 815 at 844. 
70 [1919] AC 815 at 844. 
71 Ibid, at 844-845. 
72 [1919] AC 815. 
73 See James E Hogg, Roman Catholic Bequests for Masses: The House of Lords’ Decision (1920) 36 LQR 53. 
74 Bourne v Keane [1919] AC at 882. 
75 Carrigan v Redwood (1910) 30 NZLR 244. 
76 Nelan v Downes (1917) 23 CLR 546. 




The trust law disabilities suffered by religions other than the Established Church, were removed 
by three Acts77 which were spaced over the first half of the 19th century, and which operated 
retrospectively. The position now is that the law does not prefer one religion over another78; 
makes no distinction between one religion and another79; and, as between different religions, 
stands neutral.80 
 
In Gilmour v Coats81 Lord Reid ruled that the law must accept the position that it is right that 
different religions should each be supported “irrespective of whether or not all its beliefs are 
true”, and that where a particular belief is accepted by one religion and rejected by another the 
law “can neither accept nor reject it”. To the same effect, Sir John Romilly MR said in Thornton v 
Howe82 that a gift would be charitable if: 
 
“the tendency [of the gift] were not immoral and although this court might consider the 
opinions sought to be propagated foolish or even devoid of foundation”. 
 
Nowadays a gift for the “advancement of religion” will be a valid charitable gift regardless of the 
identity of the religion concerned. 
 
There does not appear to be any reported decision in England or other Commonwealth 
jurisdiction which discusses the rationale for treating the advancement of religion as a charitable 
purpose. In regard to that matter, Picarda, in his Law and Practice Relating to Charities,83 cites 
19th century American decisions which describe religion as a “valuable constituent in the 
character of our citizens”; “the surest basis on which to rest the superstructure of social order”; 
and as “necessary to the advancement of civilisation and the production of the welfare of 
society”84; and accords to the following judicial comment the accolade, “the most colourful 
transatlantic statement”: 
 
“The duties enjoined by religious bodies ... furnish a sure basis on which the 
fabric of civil society can rest without which it would not endure. Take from it 
those supports and it would tremble into chaos and ruin. Anarchy would follow 
order and liberty, freed from its restraining influence, would soon degenerate into 
the wildest licence, which would convert the beautiful earth into a howling 
pandemonium, fit only for the habitation of savage beasts and more savage 
men.”85 
 
Arguably the rationale for treating advancement of religion as charitable is to a large extent 
indicated by its public benefit character.  
 
Subject to one exception, a purpose is not charitable unless it is of the necessary public 
character86 – a trust or gift for religious purposes is not excused from meeting this criterion of 
                                                          
77 Unitarian Relief Act 1813; Roman Catholic Charities Act 1832; Religious Disabilities Act 1846. 
78 Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426, 457-8 per Lord Reid. 
79 Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14 at 19; 54 ER 1042 at 1044 per Sir John Romilly MR. 
80 Neville Estate Ltd v Madden [1962] Ch 832 at 853 per Cross J. 
81 [1949] AC 426 at 458-9. 
82 (1862) 31 Beav 14 at 19; 54 ER 1042 at 1044. 
83 3rd ed (Butterworths, London, 1999). 
84 Ibid, p 84. 
85 Ibid., p 84. Picarda does not provide the name, citation, or any source reference for the quoted statement. 
However a statement in the quoted terms is made by Hall J in Trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church, 
South v City of Atlanta 76 Ga 181 at 192 (1886). 
86 Re Compton [1945] Ch 123 at 129 per Lord Greene MR. 
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legal charity.87 The purpose must be to benefit the community or a section of the community – 
the beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and must not fall to be determined by their 
connection with a private individual or private individuals or with a company or other employer; 
nor may they be merely particular individuals pointed out by the donor or a fluctuating class of 
private individuals.88 The sole exception to this principle is the class of trusts for the relief of 
poverty known as the “poor relations cases”.89 
 
In general where the gift is prima facie within the “advancement of religion” head of charity, the 
courts assume that the public benefit requirement is satisfied. The law “assumes that it is good 
for man to have and to practise a religion” said Lord Reid in Gilmour v Coats.90 His Lordship 
went on to conclude: 
 
“A religion can be regarded as beneficial without it being necessary to assume that all its 
beliefs are true, and a religious service can be regarded as beneficial to all those who 
attended it without it being necessary to determine the spiritual efficacy of that service or 
to accept any particular belief about it.”91 
 
Cross J in Neville Estate Ltd v Madden92 was of the view that the court is “entitled to assume” 
that some benefit accrues to the public from the attendance at places of worship of persons who 
live in this world and mix with their fellow citizens. 
 
Mainstream Christian teaching directs the individual to both assist and love the poor and his 
neighbour (whether rich or poor).93 So it is perhaps far from outrageous to suggest Christian 
values as the fons et origo of those uses and purposes which by at least 1805 came within the 
conception of the technical term “charitable” or “charity”. 
 
Government endorsement of a public role for religion is not a risk 
 
There seems to be no sound reason for religious involvement in the public forum to be confined 
by formal or informal parameters. No additional parameters seem to be necessary or called for, 
since adequate “checks and balances” already exist in Australian society to protect against even 
a coalition tyranny by the majoritarian Christian religions. 
 
The checks and balances include the following: 
 
1. Though a majority of religions in Australia have a common Christianity at their core, their 
plural doctrinal differences ensure that there is little likelihood of their sufficiently allying 
themselves together to tyrannise either the non-Christian believers in Australian society, 
or those who have disavowed a regular need for religion in their lives, be they stridently 
antagonistic or quietly disinterested. 
                                                          
87 Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426; Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council [1975] 1 NSWLR 744 - an appeal to 
the Privy Council was dismissed. In Hoare v Hoare (1886) 56 LT 147 the Court did not uphold as charitable a 
gift to provide for Church of England services in a private chapel - the chapel was simply a private “chapel in a 
gentleman’s house” (56 LT at 150). 
88 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 at 308; Verge v Somerville [1924] AC 496 at 
499 per Lord Wrenbury. 
89 Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 at 308; Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601 HL. 
90 [1949] AC 426 at 458-9. 
91 Ibid. 
92 [1962] Ch 832 at 853. 
93 The Bible (King James Version), e.g.: “The righteous considereth the cause of the poor: but the wicked 
regardeth not to know it” (Prov 29:7); “If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, 
and thou shalt have treasure in heaven” (Matt 19:21); “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” (Matt 22:39, 
James 2:8); “And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor ... and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” 
(1 Cor 13:3). 
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2. The press news media. The manner in which the media operate today creates a 
considerable fetter upon even the idea that a majoritarian Christian coalition could 
tyrannise any unbelieving minority. While it is true that the press did not protect Jews in 
Weimar Germany or elsewhere as the expansionist Third Reich moved into other 
European countries in the absence of significant institutional church opposition, it is 
difficult to imagine that the Australian media would today allow any majoritarian 
persecution of a religious minority. 
3. There is a strengthening argument that the majoritarian tyranny we should fear in 
Australian society is to be found in its disavowal of a religious source for its moral values 
in favour of an overtly secular and even atheistic paradigm that would persecute any 
religious perspective out of the public arena. 
 
Promotion of religion is a charitable objective relevant in 2001, and sufficient safeguards do exist 
in contemporary Australian society to ensure that State encouraged (though not established) 
religion would not tyrannise any citizen. 
 
Should “the advancement of religion” be a protected charitable object in 2001? 
 
Public benefit is a hallmark of charitable objects. Courts have in the past acknowledged a public 
benefit in the advancement of religion. There seems no good reason why that view should not 
continue to be accepted today and be encouraged in Australia by future state policy and by 
direct regulatory props. It is noted that in its recent report to Parliament, the Sheppard 
Committee affirmed that “the advancement of religion” should continue as a head of charity.94  
 
Australia’s current secular and at times even areligious mood would disavow all religion as a 
crutch for lesser human beings unable or unwilling to stand on their own two feet.95 But that does 
not deny the existence of advantages – “public benefit” – which organised and institutional 
religion does and can provide to Australia in the 21st century and beyond. 
 
It is clear that religion continues to have relevance in bridging the gap between “private 
conscience” and “the general acceptance of values that sustain the law and social behaviour”.96  
There is also abundant evidence that churches are actively involved in the social issues of 
today97; and even though the churches are reluctant to “sound a trumpet”, the exhortation being 
“almsgiving is best done in secret”98, church involvement in large-scale humanitarian projects 
and welfare relief is legend.99 
 
Indeed, successive Australian governments have recognised this significant involvement with 
continued tax-free status for churches themselves and some tax deductions for taxpayers who 
donate their efforts within approved educational and poverty relief boundaries.100  It must be 
                                                          
94 Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, June 2001 (Chairman: The 
Hon. Ian Sheppard AO QC), Chapter 20. 
95 “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a 
spiritless situation.  It is the opium of the people. 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness.” 
[All italics original] 
K Marx, “Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right”, in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Religion, 
Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957, p 42.) 
96 See Appendix I (1996 Australian Census information on demographics of religions in Australia). 
97 For example, religious institutions are prominently involved in promoting heroin injecting rooms, 
government subcontracting of state unemployment relief schemes to religious agencies, soup kitchens, and more 
traditional welfare assistance (clothes, food and money). 
98 The Bible, above n 93, Mattew 6:1-4. 
99 The work of the Salvation Army, City Missions, Catholic Relief Agencies, SDA Melanesian programs, LDS 
Charities, are some of the many examples that readily spring to mind. 
100 See for example, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, s.50-5 and Division 30 of Part III. 
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acknowledged that official state efforts to provide similar services in the Australian community 
and overseas would be much less efficient (at least in terms of money outlaid) than what is 
already provided by the churches since church efforts are to a large extent (and in many 
instances, wholly) subsidised by volunteerism – private citizens who devote a significant part of 
their time and resources, incurring expenses for which no tax deduction is claimed. The Asprey 
Committee, in its Full Report, noted that charitable organisations (which includes churches) are 
regarded in most developed countries as playing an important part in the social structure; and 
further, that they perform community welfare services which State instrumentalities financed 
from revenue would otherwise be called on to provide.101 
 
How religion bridges the Chief Justice’s gap 
 
It is submitted that the bridging of the gap, the moving from belief to action consistent with that 
belief, is a product of the religious teachings about faith in a supernatural/divine being, coupled 
with their instruction about individual accountability and responsibility at a day of judgment 
and/or an afterlife102 – these introduce a “big picture” perspective for all believers, something that 
society otherwise struggles to provide. People who believe in and follow religious teachings are 
willing to delay gratification103, even enduring severe hardship and deprivation as they do so, but 
without losing confidence or hope and happiness in the present. 
 
This is not to say that other people in Australian society without religious faith are irresponsible 
or unaccountable, or that they cannot delay gratification for necessarily extended periods. But 
religious teachings have proven durable in providing more of the people with this capability and 
maturity than human beings without religious teachings seem able generally to find. The Chief 
Justice might properly be taken as supporting this view in saying: 
 
“People sometimes react with surprise and even indignation when church leaders make 
a public affirmation of religious doctrine. But what is to be expected of church leaders if 
they do not, from time to time, do that? Have people really considered what the social 
consequences would be if the great religions abandoned their teaching role?”104 
 
Cost-benefit analysis of “encouraging” religion 
 
Failure to understand these fundamental truisms, perhaps because it is unfashionable to speak 
of them in this secular age, seems not only to have obscured their reality, but to have delivered 
to secular arguments which suppress religion, an irrational upper hand. (Of course the 
secularisation of society is not the work of government policy alone, but the implication that the 
only society that is fair is that society which equally devalues all religion, is irrational.) 
 
It seems axiomatic that government policies which encourage private philanthropy as well as 
charitable and religious donations are wholly supportive of real and substantive benefits to 
society.105 In purely economic terms, it is arguable that the cost of state encouragement of 
                                                          
101 Taxation Review Committee (Asprey Committee), Full Report, 31 January 1975, (AGPS, Canberra, 1974), 
para 25.20. 
102 Professor Cole Durham has observed that the equivalent of “the Golden Rule” in Christianity (“whatsoever 
ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them” Matthew 7:12) is found in virtually every major 
religious tradition: Durham, above n 8, pp.11-12. See Appendix II. 
103 “Delaying gratification” is one of the four simple tools of discipline by which all human beings “can solve 
all problems”; it is “a process of scheduling the pain and pleasure in life in such a way as to enhance the 
pleasure by meeting and experiencing the pain first and getting it over with.  It is the only decent way to live”; 
this “process of scheduling is learned by most children quite early in life ... [but] a substantial number of 
adolescents fall far short of this norm ... These are the problem students.” M Scott Peck, The Road Less 
Travelled, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978, pp 15-20. 
104 See above, n 3, at 95. 
105 See above, n 101. 
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private philanthropy as well as charitable and religious donations is outweighed by the benefits – 
the cost being in general, subsidies in the form of tax concessions and overt approval and 
encouragement of a larger role for institutional religions in society (despite any criticisms that 
may come from the areligionists’ corner), and a significant measurable benefit being an 
amelioration of the demands on government resources for social welfare purposes.106 
 
But there will be unmeasurable benefits to society too.  Religious emphasis on faith in individuals 
wrought by doctrinally based teachings about individual responsibility107 enhance good 
citizenship and challenge “the rights obsession” that individualisation in society has brought with 
it.108  A healthy society requires a sense of communal responsibility in its citizens to thrive.109  
And a sense of community cannot prosper when its principal private institutions are marginalised 
by a government policy that does not recognise, honour and encourage them. 
 
Social goals are regularly pursued by, almost solely, promulgation and enforcement of legal 
rights. Achieving that same goal by also promoting correlative obligations and responsibilities is, 
in effect, the path encouraged by Gleeson CJ in pointing to what religion can do by inculcating 
morality. The same idea is evident in these comments of Justice Dallin H Oaks110 in April 1984: 
 
“The preservation of a civilized society depends upon the willingness of many of its 
members to fulfill responsibilities they are free to ignore. It may even depend to some 
extent on the willingness of many to forgo the pursuit of rights they are free to enforce.... 
Any person who is concerned with preserving the force of law and the enforceability of 
individual rights should be profoundly concerned about the civic responsibilities upon 
which the legal order is based.”111 
 
Religious pluralism enhances society 
 
The protection and encouragement of religious pluralism is a sound future path for government 
policy, not just because it wisely harvests volunteerism and private philanthropy, but because it 
is the only enduring way society has yet evolved to nourish acknowledged moral and community 
values. Some will complain that institutional religion will not respond to allegedly valid social 
lobbying which is inconsistent with its doctrinal teaching. The real concern – exaggerated for 
effect – is probably that religion does not accept every lobbied change in social/moral values and 
does not accept those which it does eventually concede, quickly enough.112 
                                                          
106 See above, n 101, para 25.20.  The care of the poor was an historical concern of the churches alone through 
parish workhouses and the like. It was not until the welfare state experiments which followed the First World 
War and the Great Depression that national governments began accepting a social responsibility for the care of 
the needy from tax dollars. 
107 Of course, religion is not the only source of such altruism in society.  For while President John F Kennedy’s 
political views may well have had their genesis in his early religious instruction at home, his famous line, “Ask 
not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country”, is not generally credited as a 
religious instruction flowing from a religious leader. 
108 The Honourable Mr Justice Iacobucci (Supreme Court of Canada) has advanced this thesis, “Legal rights 
and freedoms cannot be properly understood without appreciating the existence of corresponding rights-duties 
and freedoms-responsibilities. This understanding of rights-duties and freedoms-responsibilities in turn rests 
ultimately on moral and theological principles which inform our Western political, religious, and philosophical 
cultures and traditions.” In the same address his Honour concludes, “Without the values and principles which 
underlie ... our democratic institutions and policy, there can be no recourse to rights or freedoms.”: See, Frank 
Iacobucci “The Evolution of Constitutional Rights and Corresponding Duties: The Leon Ladner Lecture” (1992) 
UBC Law Review 1 at 1 and 18. 
109 Individuation wrought by government policy legitimates and encourages selfish attitudes.  More careful 
attention to the subliminal messages of government policy can conversely legitimate attitudes that are more 
socially responsible and unselfish. 
110 At the time, a Judge of the Utah Supreme Court. 
111 D H Oaks, “Rights and Responsibilities”, (1995) 36 Mercer Law Review 427 at 435. 
112 Tocqueville, above n 22, p 305: “Thus, while the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion 




While society’s value base may not, in the hands of private institutional religion, move as quickly 
as some lobbyists might wish, it is demonstrable that values do move with time and education – 
even in a society which has an active and plural religious component.  It is submitted that the 
cautious brake that conservative religious elements place on societal value movement is both a 
desirable and fortuitous benefit and one to be encouraged. 
 
We need to celebrate our foundations 
 
One further comment on the benefits of a pluralistic society must be made. 
 
The benefits that these writers believe a pluralistic society can provide do not grow on their own. 
 
Those benefits must be recognised, actively chosen, celebrated and nourished.   
 
While there is much about American celebration of her democratic heritage and republican 
freedom that Australians find garish, overdone and sometimes even naive, it cannot seriously be 
denied that such celebration by itself serves to nourish and memorialise the foundations of 
democracy in America and its pluralistic religious tradition, which are so carefully indoctrinated 
from primary school. 
 
As we now willingly celebrate the second genesis of Australian identity and values at Gallipoli 
each Anzac Day, we are perhaps beginning to recognise the value of such American 
extravagance. 
 
While pomp and pageantry at Buckingham Palace may have served a similar function for 
Australia in the past as it nourished the foundations of constitutional monarchy and democracy in 
the British Commonwealth, we need to identify, magnify and celebrate our own uniquely 




Chief Justice Gleeson has suggested that religion continues to be relevant in Australian society 
because it provides a bridge between “private conscience” and “the general acceptance of 
values that sustains the law and social behaviour”.  In this paper, the authors have endeavoured 
to explain why religious uses were historically approved and encouraged as a charitable object 
and have argued that those reasons remain valid in the 21st century. As a charitable object, it is 
proper that the advancement of religion continue to have the privileges enjoyed by legal 
charities. 
 
The belief that society can only be objectively fair if it equally devalues all religion in favour of an 
areligious secular value system is rejected as being clearly irrational. And it has been further 
argued that government policy has and must increase its role in identifying and celebrating the 
contribution that religious pluralism can make to the rule of law in Australia. As the Chief Justice 
points out, it is the general acceptance of values that sustains the law, and social behaviour. 
Religion can and does have a significant role in identifying and promoting values that advocate 
and encourage personal attitudes towards others and conduct between citizens which, even in a 
non-legal sense, is charitable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
prevents them from conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust.” 
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 APPENDIX   I 
 
The 1996 Australian Census disclosed the following information about Australia’s religious 
demographics: 
 
 Male Female Persons 
Christian: 
Anglican 1,867,364 2,035,960 3,903,324 
Baptist 139,480 155,698 295,178 
Brethren 10,599 11,464 22,063 
Catholic 2,332,441 2,466,509 4,798,950 
Churches of Christ 33,377 41,646 75,023 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 37,145 46,269 83,414 
Latter-day Saints 21,171 23,941 45,112 
Lutheran 121,009 128,980 249,989 
Oriental Christian 15,979 15,363 31,342 
Orthodox 253,261 243,754 497,015 
Pentecostal 81,640 93,080 174,720 
Presbyterian and Reformed 328,126 347,408 675,534 
Salvation Army 32,975 41,170 74,145 
Seventh-day Adventist 23,831 28,824 52,216 
Uniting Church 611,979 722,938 1,334,917 
Other Protestant 23,395 26,821 50,216 
Other Christian 15,574 17,484 33,058 
Christian, n.f.d. 87,885 98,224 186,109 
Total 6,037,231 6,545,533 12,582,764 
 
Non-Christian: 
Buddhism 97,173 102,639 199,812 
Hinduism 34,950 32,329 67,279 
Islam 105,313 95,572 200,885 
Judaism 38,560 41,245 79,805 
Other religions 34,651 33,996 68,647 
Total 310,647 305,781 616,428 
 
No religion(a) 1,609,849 1,339,039 2,948,888 
Inadequately described (b) 28,967 25,197 54,164 
Not stated 769,732 753,853 1,550,585 
Overseas visitor 65,798 73,796 139,594 
 
TOTAL 8,849,224 9,043,199 17,892,423 
 
 
(a) Includes “No religion n.f.d.”, “Agnosticism”, “Atheism”, “Humanism” and “Rationalism”. 
(b) Includes “Religious belief, n.f.d.”. 
 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996 Census of Population and Housing, Selected Social and 
Housing Characteristics, Catalogue No 2015.0, p B10.) 
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 APPENDIX  II 
 
The equivalent of “the Golden Rule” in Christianity (“whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
you, do ye even so to them” Matthew 7:12) as found in the traditions of other major religions’ 
traditions: 
 
“See, eg., Analects 15:23 (“Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto 
you”) (Confucianism); Mahabharata 5:151 (“This is the sum of duty: do naught unto 
others which would cause you pain if done to you”) (Hinduism); Talmud, Shabbat 31a 
(“What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man”) (Judaism); Urdana-Varga 5:18 (“Hurt 
not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful”) (Buddhism); Dadistan-i-Dinik 94:5 
(“That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its 
own self”) (Zoroastrianism); Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi 13 (“Not one of you is a believer 
until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself”) (Islam); Baha’u’llah, Tablets of 
Baha’u’llah 71 (“Blessed is he who preferreth his brother before himself”) (Bahà’ì); 
Sutrakritanga 1.11.33 (“A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself 
would be treated”) (Jainism); Guru Arjan Devji 259, Guru Granth Sahib (“Don’t create 
enmity with anyone as God is within everyone”) (Sikhism).” 
 
(WC Durham Jr, “The Doctrine of Religious Freedom”, Devotional Address, Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, USA, 3 April 2001, pp 11-12, unpublished at the time of this writing.) 
 
